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Middleton: Quieting Title to Real Property

LEGISLATIVE NOTES
QUIETING TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY
Florida Laws 1947, c. 24099
The legal or equitable owner of land in Florida has four primary
equitable procedures by which he may quiet his title:
1. Re-establishment of
destroyed by fire.1
2. The 1889 quiet-title
3. The 1925 quiet-title
4. The 1947 quiet-title

land titles when the records have been
act. 2
act.8
act."

I. EQUITABLE Jr asDICTioN
The purpose of a bill to quiet title is to relieve the owner of the
threat of litigation based upon invalid claims which make his title doubtful or affect its marketability. Originally, equity proceeded quia timet,
acting in personam. Through an action and decree in personam persons
brought to the bar could be coerced to render up the invalid instrument
for cancelation or to make a conveyance of the interest claimed. Enforcement was by contempt proceedings. To secure jurisdiction to act in
personam and to render an in personam decree, it was necessary to serve
the defendant personally within the jurisdiction of the court. 5 Personal
compliance with the order was necessary to accomplish the purpose of
the decree. 6
Two important factors in the United States have resulted in a change
in the nature of the equitable jurisdiction. States are quasi-sovereign,
and process in civil suits runs only to their borders. The citizens of the
United States move freely from one state to another, acquiring and

'FLA.
3F.A.
aFLA.
'LA.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

1941,
1941,
1941,
1941,

§71.14 et seq.
§66.10.
§66.16 et seq.
§66.28 et seq. (Supp. 1947).

Mart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151, 3 Sup. Ct. 586, 28 L. Ed. 101 (1884).

'Davidson

v. Sharpe, 28

N. C.

15 (1845); J. R. v. M. P., Y. B. 37 Hen. V1,

f. 13, pL. 3 (1459).

E 39S 1
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retaining property interests under the protection of the Constitution.7
The result is that personal service is ineffective as a means of securing
jurisdiction over any persons having claims to lands within a state if they
are beyond the boundaries of the state.8
A few states solved the jurisdictional problem by providing for constructive service upon non-residents, declaring that a court of equity
has the inherent power to act in rem.9 Florida followed this policy with
the original act for quieting title.1o The other states, not deciding
whether a court of equity has this inherent power, provided both a
constructive service statute and a statute permitting the decree, in a suit
to quiet title, to operate as a conveyance."1 Florida followed this policy
with the 1925 act.
II.

LimITATIONS UPON PROCEDURE PRIOR TO 1947

Procedure under the 1925 act is not available to test the validity of
the source of the plaintiff's title. Construction of the act denied jurisdiction of a suit by an owner deraigning from a tax title to quiet the
record title, without some other basis for the suit than the mere existence
of the record title.' 2 Jurisdiction is also denied in a suit for a declaraatory judgment designed to accomplish the same purpose.' 3 Realizing
that a tax title is replete with possible future claims, the expectancy of
which directly and adversely affects the marketability of land, the legislature removed this limitation in 1943 and permitted a direct remedy
4
by the tax title holder in a quiet-title suit.'
'Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 56 Sup. Ct. 252, 80 L. Ed. 299 (1935);
Cf. FLA. CONST., DEcL. or RIGHTs §18.

'Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 287, 11 Sup. Ct.
92, 34 L. Ed. 670 (1890); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877).
'Alabama, New Mexico, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina; see
WALiSH, EQuITY 50 (1930).

"0 See Myakka Co. v. Edwards, 68 Fla. 372, 386, 67 So. 217 (1914).

"Berton v. All Persons, 176 Cal. 610, 170 Pac. 151 (1917); Garfein v. McInnis,
248 N. Y. 261,162 N. E. 73 (1928).
"'Taff v. Hodge, 132 Fla. 642, 182 So. 230 (1938); Woodman v. Jones, 101
Fla. 177, 133 So. 620 (1931); Florida Central & Ga. Ry. v. Boswell, 98 Fla. 117,
123 So. 567 (1929).
'Woodman v. Jones, 101 Fla. 177, 133 So. 620 (1931); Stuart v. Stephanus,
94 Fla. 1087, 114 So. 767 (1927).

"FLA. STAT. 1941, §§66.26, 66.27 (Supp. 1947), Beebe v. Richardson, 156 Fla.
559, 23 So.2d 718 (1945).
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A bill against unknown defendants with unknown claims is not a
justiciable matter under the 1925 statute.1 5 Such a bill neither advises
the defendant of the nature of the case nor advises the court what decree
it shall make.:'& Under the rules of res judicata, there must be set out
in the decree either a known claim or a known claimant, for the suit is
binding only on the parties thereto and the issues therein.1 7 The constructive service act permits constructive service upon unknown persons
without stating the nature of their claims; but it does not eliminate the
necessity of allegations in the bill showing the basis or character of the
claims of interest or title by such persons.' 5
Under the act providing for re-establishment of land titles when the
records have been destroyed by fire, the parties plaintiff or their grantors
must have been in actual possession of the land at the time of the
destruction of the records, and such parties must also be in possession
at the time of bringing suit.' 9 "Actual possession" is not here defined,
but the insertion of the adjective indicates that constructive possession
at the time of the destruction would not be sufficient. The act does not
provide for re-establishment when the means of loss is other than fire.
It does provide for the establishment of title rather than for the reestablishment of the record, which is merely evidence of the title, and
20
does establish it against all persons known or unknown.
III. TE 1947 AcT
The Nature of the Proceeding. A person who claims or has conveyed
by warranty deed a freehold estate in real property within the state may
bring a proceeding in rem against all the world in the county in which
the property is situated, in order to establish title and to determine all
21
adverse claims.
The legislature has thus prescribed an action in rem, but the determina"Greene v. Uniacke, 46 F.2d 916 (C. C. A. 5th), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 847, 51
Sup. Ct. 493, 75 L. Ed. 1455 (1931).
"Mclaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926); accord, Welborn v.
Pierce, 75 Fla. 667, 78 So. 929 (1918).
'Greene v. Uniacke, 46 F.2d 916 (C. C. A. 5th), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 847, 51
Sup. Ct. 493, 75 L. Ed. 1455 (1931).
"'Tibbetts v. Olson, 91 Fla. 824, 108 So. 679 (1926); Cobb v. Hawsey, 56 Fla.
159, 47 So. 484 (1908).
FLA. STAT. 1941, §71.15.
'FA. STAT. 1941, §71.14.
FLRA. STAT. 1941, §66.28 (Supp. 1947).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 6
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
tion of the legislature, although persuasive, is not final as to the nature
of the action. The courts must interpret the act as a whole to determine
whether such result was intended, construing its provisions in the light of
22
conditions existing at the time of its passage.
A proceeding in rem is one taken against the property, and has for
its object the disposition of the property without reference to the title
of individual claimants.2 3 A judgment in rem determines the status of
the property, and by force thereof it ipso facto becomes what the judgment says it is.2 4 Thus a probate decision declares a will to be valid or
invalid; 2 5 the fact that incidentally the right of legatees may be determined is immaterial. Of a similar nature is the proceeding against land
for taxes; 2 6 the interests of private persons in the land are not material
to the determination that the land be assessed at a particular rate, nor
to the determination that the title thereto be forfeited. The process in
such cases runs against the res; constructive notice of the fact of such
27
proceedings is sufficient to make all the world parties.
For the purpose of Florida practice it is necessary to determine the
question of the nature of the action, because of the clear-cut decision in
Reina v. Hope2 8 that provisions for service other than by publication
are directory in an in rem action. This decision has been criticized on
the basis that the ratio decidendi was a reluctance to alter a prior decision
because of general reliance thereon; 2 9 and a recent case indicates that
the court may have reconsidered its position. 30 Yet the proceeding is in
rem, and the process runs against the res, not against the interested persons. This is the true basis; it is fundamental and may not be altered.
Validity of the act under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not depend upon a determination that the action is in
rem or quasi in rem. Due process requires only that the court which
"American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 31 Sup. CL 200, 55 L. Ed. 82
(1911); Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 88 Pac. 356
(1906).
"Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877).
"Stiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 34 Okla. 45, 124 Pac. 595 (1912); see
Bartero v. Real Estate Savings Bank, 10 Mo. App. 76, 78 (1881).
"Torrey v. Bruner, 60 Fla. 365, 53 So. 337 (1910).
"Reina v. Hope, 30 So.2d 172 (Fla. 1947).
"Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 27 Sup. Ct. 261, 31 L. Ed. 461 (1907).
"30 So.2d 172 (Fla. 1947).
"'22 FLA. L. J. 21 (1948).
"See Golden v. Grady, 34 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1948).
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assumes to determine the rights of parties shall have jurisdiction, and
that there shall be notice and an opportunity to be heard. 3 1 It is not
essential that the court have jurisdiction of the person; if the res, the
subject matter of the controversy, is within the jurisdiction, the court
can adjudicate the defendant's interest therein. 3 2 In spite of this, it
is well to note that a true in rem action that did not exist in substantially
the same area of operation prior to passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
is extremely rare, 3 3 the courts avoiding decision of the question by assuming that the action is quasi in rem. 3 4
A decree in rem is binding upon all persons if it is binding upon any
person, since it ipso facto determines the status of the res. An examination of Florida decisions under the 1925 act shows that a decree under
that act is in rem only as to the interests of persons actually made parties
thereto, and as to claims or clouds that are alleged in the declaration. The
compendious discussion in McDaniel v. McElvy 3 5 shows that a known
claimant or a known claim is necessary for a binding decree. In Greene
v. Uniacke3 61it was held that a person who was not made a defendant in
an action and whose claim was not set out in the bill was not bound by
a decree therein, on the basis that the statute failed to make unknown
claims by unknown persons justiciable. Nor does the constructive service
act permit joinder of unknown defendants claiming unknown interests, for
37
the restriction is one of equitable procedure rather than service of process.
Unknown persons having known claims are made parties by specific allegation of the cloud on title if one is claimed to exist, or by allegation of
the facts constituting the basis of a mere claim of interest and facts showing the invalidity thereof. 3 8 Thus, the decree determines only those
issues before the court. An issue so determined by a court having jurisdiction over the cause is final unless reversed upon appeal. In this it

"lAmerican Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 31 Sup. Ct. 200, 55 L. Ed. 82 (1911).
"Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261, 32 Sup. Ct. 303, 56 L. Ed. 429 (1912). But gee
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877) (property must be seized).
"Cf. Hobbs v. Lenon, 191 Ark. 509, 87 S. W.2d 6 (1935).
"See American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 31 Sup. Ct. 200, 55 L. Ed. 82
(1911); Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 88 Pac. 356

(1906).
3391 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926).
3646 F.2d 916 (C. C. A. 5th), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 847, S1 Sup. Ct. 493, 75
L. Ed. 1455 (1931).

"Brecht v. Bur-Ne Co., 01 Fla. 345, 108 So. 173 (1926).
"Tibbetts v. Olson, 91 Fla. 824, 108 So. 679 (1926).
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binds all persons; the validity of the claim or interest is ascertained, and
by force of the decree the interest is transferred or secured to the true
owner. On the other hand, should a person in possession under a void deed
quiet his title without either naming the true owner, or his interest, in
the bill, that issue would not have been determined, and as to that interest
no person would be affected by the decree.
Because of this fundamental difference in the subject-matter of the
decrees, the judgment against the interest or claim is spoken of as quasi
'40
in rem 39 or as "a proceeding in rem in a larger and more general sense."
The concept is defined as a term applied to prcoeedings which are not
strictly or purely in rem but are brought against the defendant personally,
though the real object is to deal with particular property or to subject
41
property to the discharge of claims asserted,
If the supreme importance that is accorded to land in Anglo-Saxon
law is recognized, it will be seen that a private action concerning interests
in land requires a different and more effective type of process upon
owners of known adverse interests than is given in an action in rem in
order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the cause. This same
importance requires effective settlement of the action, secured by a
decree final as to the cause before the court, which is given by a decree
in rem.
An Action Quasi in Rem. The major difficulties under the 1925 act
may be met by considering procedure under the 1947 act to be quasi in
rem. Proceedings may be had against unknown interests held by unknown claimants. Adequate provision is made for personal service when
possible and for constructive service when necessary. Provision is made
for testing plaintiff's title by a proceeding against known privy or adverse
claimants or against unknown claimants with unknown claims.
A number of restrictions and precautions for the procedure of quieting
title are closely inter-related to other fields of property law and depend
upon a determination that this action is quasi in rem. For example, a
person who is in possession of property must be personally served with
process, 42 since there is an irrebuttable presumption of knowledge of
"'McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926).
'8 Pennoyer
"Freeman
Hill v. Henry,
"Harrison

v.
v.
66
v.

Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877).
Alderson, 119 U. S. 185, 7 Sup. Ct. 165, 30 L. Ed. 372 (1886);
N. J. Eq. 150, 57 AtI. 554 (1904).
Dolan, 172 Mass. 395, 52 N. E. 513 1899); Harris v. Barnes,
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his possession and of his claim from the fact of his possession; 43 if
personal service can be effected by the exercise of reasonable diligence,
substituted service is unauthorized; 4 4 a record title owner whose name is
apparent in the record is considered known, 4 5 and personal service upon
him is necessary if he is a resident and it can be had; the state or any
subdivision thereof must be actually served with process or its rights
4
may not be determined. 0
This action does not proceed as an action in rem. Although the
action is by the owner against all the world, 4 7 if there are known claim48
ants or if claimants appear, there is a case which proceeds inter partes.
There is no taking of custody of the property involved which differs
from the custody taken under the 1925 act. 4 9 Where only the plaintiff
appears and a decree is taken pro confesso, the decree is rendered in
accordance with the sworn bill of the plaintiff as a party;5 o it would be
a manifest absurdity to say that the object of the proceeding is to
determine the status of the property without reference to his title;
rather, the entire object of the proceeding is to determine the validity
and extent of his title, not as such but as against any claims which could
or should be asserted.
Jurisdiction of the property. In this proceeding, jurisdiction and
control by the court is taken by a lis pendens filed with the bill5 and by

137 Neb. 905, 291 N. W. 721 (1940); Kilian v. Hubbard, 69 S.D. 286, 9 N. W.2d
700 (1943); cf. Smetal Corp. v. West Lake Investment Co., 126 Fla. 595, 172 So.

581 (1936).
"Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Roper, 68 Fla. 299, 67 So. 115, prior appeal
dismised, 67 Fla. 518, 68 So. 1023 (1914); Tate v. Pensacola Gulf Land & Development Co., 37 Fla. 439, 20 So. 542 (1896).
"Hoffman v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 386, 90 Pac. 939 (1907); Title & Document
Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 88 Pac. 356 (1906); Davis v. Brewer,
135 Fla. 752, 186 So. 207 (1939) Smetal Corp. v. West Lake Investment Co.,
126 Fla. 595, 172 So. 58 (1936) ; Tibbetts v. Olson, 91 Fla. 824, 108 So. 679 (1926).
"Federal Land Bank v. Dekle, 108 Fla. 555, 148 So. 756 (1933).
"'Berton
v. All Persons, 176 Cal. 610, 170 Pac. 151 (1917).
' 7FLA. STAT. 1941, §66.29 (Supp. 1947).
'"FLA.STAT. 1941, §66.35 (Supp. 1947).
"Compare FLA. STAT. 1941, §§66.32, 66.36 (Supp. 1947) with ErA. STAT. 1941,
§166.18, 47.49.
0Fr.A. STAT. 1941, §6637 (Supp. 1947).
1
" FLA. STAT. 1941, §66.36 (Supp. 1947).
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a summons posted on the property. 52 A lis pendens is defined as the
jurisdiction, power, or control that courts have, during the pendency of
an action, over the property involved therein, 5 3 the filing thereof giving
priority to the decree rendered over prior unrecorded and subsequent
conveyances. 5 4 A copy of the summons, with a memorandum of known
claimants, must be posted in a conspicuous place on the property within
fifteen days after the first publication of the summons. 5 5 This is a
seizure of the property which does not consist of actual possession; it
is sufficient if the person who has possession is officially notified that
the court has control of the property for the satisfaction or determination
of claims thereto. 5 6 The law presumes an owner to be in possession
himself or by his agent; the attaching of the property is notice to come
57
forward and assert his claim.
Jurisdictionof the person. Service of process upon persons named in
the bill is in the manner of a summons ad respondendum if the persons
are found in the state; but, if such person is a resident who cannot be
found after due diligence or whose address was not given in the bill, the
summons shall be mailed to him at the county seat of the county in
which the property lies. 5 8 For defendants, resident or non-resident,
whose addresses are known but who are not found within the state,
substituted service by mail is required. For all other persons-known
non-residents whose addresses are unknown, or unknown claimants--constructive service is authorized. 5 9
Validity of process. The state may regulate the manner and conditions upon which the property within its borders may be acquired, enjoyed, or transferred, and the title thereto quieted and determined. 6 0
5

FLA. STAT. 1941, §66.32 (Supp. 1947).

53

DePass v. Chitty, 90 Fla. 77, 105 So. 148 (1925).
1941, §695.01, O'Bryan v. Phillips, 123 Fla. 302, 166 So. 820 (1936).
"FLA. STAT. 1941, §66.32 (Supp. 1947).
"Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282, 44 Sup. Ct. 108, 68 L.
Ed. 301 (1923); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877).
7
" Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Imp. Co., 130 U. S. 559, 9 Sup. Ct. 603, 32
L. Ed. 1045 (1889).
"FLA. STAT. 1941, §66-33 (Supp. 1947).
"'FLA. STAT. 1941, §6632 (Supp. 1947).
"0Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, 16 Sup. Ct. 585, 40 L. Ed. 691 (1896);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877).
"FLA. STAT.
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The duty of providing certain and convenient methods of quieting title
is upon the state. 0 ' It is, therefore, competent for the state to prescribe
the conditions and circumstances under which constructive process will
issue. It is competent for the legislature to authorize the issuance of
constructive process upon allegations which follow the wording of the
statute, unsupported by other allegations which show that personal service
is impossible or impracticable. 0 2 Under this statute an allegation that
personal service is impossible would be unnecessary, since the summons
which issues is addressed to all persons, both known or unknown, and
the order of publication comes as a matter of course upon filing a proper
03
complaint.
The sole restriction upon the authority of the legislature to prescribe
the manner of issuing substituted process and the form thereof, in suits
of this nature, is the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions. 6 4 The criterion is not the probability of conceivable injury but
the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference
to the subject with which the statute deals. 6 5
The period of notice is adequate. 6 6 It is the same as in other proceedings under the constructive service act.6 7 In proceedings of this
nature, periods of time from ten days to thirty days have been held
valid.6 8 A Florida statute providing for four weeks' publication was
cited in a United States Supreme Court decision holding five days' notice
to non-residents insufficient. 6 9
'"Heck v. Nicholas, 6 F.2d 10 (C. C. A. 8th 1925); McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla.
770, 2 108 So. 820 (1926).
" Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282, 44 Sup. Ct. 108, 68
L. Ed. 301 (1923); American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S.47, 31 Sup. Ct. 200,
55 L. Ed. 82 (1911).
sFLA. STAT. 1941, §66.31 (Supp. 19.47) ; Hoffman v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 386,
90 Pac. 939 (1907); cf. McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926).
cDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926).
"'American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S.47, 31 Sup. CL 200, 55 L. Ed. 82 (1911).
"Fr.A. STAT. 1941, §66.38 (Supp. 1947).
"FLa. STAT. 1941, §48.10.
"'North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S.276, 45 Sup. Ct. 491, 69 L. Ed.
953 (1925) (three weeks); Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S.282, 44
Sup. Ct. 108, 68 L. Ed. 301 (1923) (four weeks); Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U. S.
71, 29 Sup. Ct. 580, 53 L. Ed. 914 (1909) (ten days) cf. Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U.
S. 674, 18 Sup. Ct. 229, 42 L. Ed. 622 (1898) (thirty days); Huling v. Kaw Valley
Ry. & Imp. Co., 130 U. S.559, 9 Sup. Ct. 603, 32 L. Ed. 1045 (1889) (thirty days).
"FLA. REv. STAT. §1413 (1892), cited in Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S.398, 20 Sup.
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The scope of the publication is adequate. A copy of the summons
must be conspicuously posted on each parcel. 70 An owner of property is
presumed to be in possession in person or through his agent. Publication is made in a newspaper published in the county in which the suit
71
is pending or, if there is no such paper, by posting in three public places.
It is the duty of a non-resident owner to take some measures to be represented when his property is called into requisition; and if he fails to do
this and fails to get notice by the ordinary publications which have
72
usually been required in such cases, he must suffer the consequences.
The contents of the notice are adequate. Such notice should fairly
communicate to the claimant the fact of the commencement of the suit
and its general nature, so that he may ascertain whether or not his interests
are affected. 7 3 Here the subject matter of the suit is set out with a
74
particular description of the property.
The decree. The decree rendered determines all adverse and privy
claims of private persons. 7 5 Claims of the sovereign cannot be determined
without personal service, since, without a clear intent to be bound by one
of its own laws, the state cannot be so bound.7 6 To this extent, the
decree establishes title; if regular and valid on its face it is title and not
merely evidence of the validity of title against named persons or claims.
This is a direct result of making all the world a party.
Although statutes of this type are considered remedial and highly
beneficial and will be liberally construed and applied, 7 7 still, the plaintiff
must comply strictly with the procedure outlined in the act to permit the
Ct. 410, 44 L. Ed. 520 (1900).
"FLA.

STAT. 1941, §66.32

(Supp. 1947).

"Ibid.
"North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276, 45 Sup. Ct. 491, 69 L. Ed.
953 (1925); Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Imp. Co., 130 U. S. 559, 9 Sup. Ct. 603,
32 L. Ed. 1045 (1889).

"American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 31 Sup. Ct. 200, 55 L. Ed. 82
(1911); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877); Hinely v. Wilson,
91 Fla. 815, 109 So. 468 (1926).
"'American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 31 Sup. Ct. 200, 55 L. Ed. 82 (1911);
Hoffman v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 386, 90 Pac. 939 (1907).
"'FLA. STAT. 1941, §66.44 (Supp. 1947); Berton v. All Persons, 176 Cal. 610, 170
Pac. 151 (1917).
"Berton v. All Persons, 176 Cal. 610, 170 Pac. 151 (1917).
"McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926).
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court to acquire jurisdiction and to render a valid decree. 7 8 The procedure is simplified. A complaint in the form set forth in the statute is
sufficient. 7 9 Publication and procedure therefor is carefully set out.
For this reason there should be little opportunity for direct or collateral
attack on the validity of the decree, except for fraud.
IV.

SmAR

STATUTES

The McEnerney Act. The Florida act is similar to a California law,8 0
with four major differences. The only persons who may bring the action
under the California act are those in possession in a case in which the
public records have been lost or destroyed. 8 ' In the Florida act, such
action may be brought by persons in or out of possession, claiming title
of record by adverse possession, by tax deed, by foreclosure, or in
instances in which the record title has been lost, stolen or destroyed. 8 2
The jurisdiction and power to proceed on constructive process depends
upon both the seizure of the property and the adequacy of the constructive
process provided; 8 3 the nature and source of the title of the person bringing the action should not be material. When the defendant is in possession
he may not be denied a trial by jury in ejectment, 8 4 but he must assert
such right or his interest will be determined by the court. 8 5
The California act provides that no judgment may be given by default
"'Tibbetts v. Olson, 91 Fla. 824, 108 So. 679 (1926); Reynolds v. Harrison, 90
Fla. 834, 106 So. 909 (1925); Myakka Co. v. Edwards, 68 Fla. 372, 67 So. 217 (1914);
Shrader v. Shrader, 36 Fla. 502, 18 So. 672 (1895).
"Hoffman v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 386, 90 Pac. 939 (1907); McDaniel v.
McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926).
sCAL. GEN. LAWS, Act 1026 (Deering, 1941) (CA.. STAT., c. 59, June 16, 1906),

American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 31 Sup. Ct. 200, 55 L. Ed. 82 (1911)
(statute noted in margin), Title &Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289,
88 Pac. 356 (1906) (statute noted in opinion).
"'CAL. GEN. LAWS, Act 1026, §1 (Deering, 1941).
"FLA. STAT. 1941, §66.28 (Supp. 1947).
8
Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261, 32 Sup. Ct. 303, 56 L. Ed. 429 (1912); McDaniel
v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926).
'Hughes v. Hannah, 39 Fla. 365, 22 So. 613 (1897); Internal Improvement Fund
v. Gleason, 39 Fla. 771, 23 So. 539 (1897). But see Peters v. Duluth, 119 Minn.
96, 137 N. W. 390 (1912).
"American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 260 U. S. 360, 43 Sup. Ct. 149, 67
L. Ed. 306 (1922); Griffin v. Bolen, 149 Fla. 377, 5 So.2d 690 (1942); Rosenthal
v. Largo Land Co., 146 Fla. 81, 200 So. 233 (1941).
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and that the plaintiff's claims must be proved; 8 6 the Florida act authorizes
a decree pro confesso, 8 7 in accord with Florida law that the discretionary
nature of a decree pro confesso makes it as valid a process of law as a
reiteration of the sworn bill of complaint.8 8
The California statute was construed to include a code provision for
the reopening of the decree by any person not actually served with process,
within a period of one year.8 9 This interpretation was mentioned but
not relied upon by the United States Supreme Court in holding that there
was due process. 90 A similar provision in the General Chancery Procedure
Statutes of Florida was repealed in 1943,91 and a similar provision in the
1925 quiet-title statute was not carried forward into this act. 9 2 The
procedure for reopening the decree is the same as in other chancery
pleadings, as is the procedure for reopening the decree in the first quiettitle act. 9 3 Thus the procedure should be valid process.
There are minor variations from the California statute in the instant
act in accord with Florida laws concerning the wording of the summons,
the designation of newspapers, and publication. None of these variations
changes the nature of the proceeding; and the California act, which has
been proven constitutional, is persuasive as to the validity of the Florida
law.
The Torrens Acts. The decree rendered establishes title, both privy
and adverse. In this it is directly parallel to the initial proceedings for
title registration. The numerous decisions determining the validity of
process 9 4 and the effect of the decree rendered under these acts 95 should

GEN. LAWS, Act. 1026, §10 (Deering, 1941).
FLA. STAT. 1941, §66.37 (Supp. 1947).
"McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926); cf. Ruff v. Georgia S. & F.
Ry., 67 Fla. 224, 64 So. 782 (1(14).
89
Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 88 Pac. 356 (1906).
"American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 31 Sup. Ct. 200, 55 L. Ed. 82 (1911).
91FLA. STAT. 1941, §62.12, repealed by Fla. Laws 1943, c. 22000, §6.
"CAL.
87

92

FLA. STAT. 1941, §66.22.

"Compare FLA. STAT. 1941, §66.32 (Supp. 1947) with FLA. STAT. 1941, §66.10.
"Crowell v. Akin, 152 Ga. 126, 108 S. E. 791 (1921); Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N. E. 812, writ of error dismissed, 179 U. S. 405, 21 Sup.
Ct. 206, 45 L. Ed. 252 (1900) ; Peters v. Duluth, 119 Minn. 96, 137 N. W. 390 (1912);
State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 N. W. 175 (1902).
"Follette v. Pacific Light & Power Corp., 189 Cal. 193, 208 Pac. 295 (1922)
Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 90 Pac. 129 (1907) ; Henry v. White, 123 Minn.
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be of value in understanding the instant act, although title registration
has no particular interest to Florida.

V. THE Key CASE 90
Early in 1948 Key brought a bill under the 1947 statute alleging
adverse possession for more than seven years. He did not name any
defendant in his bill. Service of process was quashed by the circuit
court on the ground that it failed to meet the requisites of due process.
On appeal the Supreme Court denied certiorari on the entirely different
theory that the bill did not present a justiciable issue. Nevertheless it
proceeded, in addition, to discuss the merits anyhow by approving the
reasoning of the chancellor.
The primary object of the proceeding was to test the constitutionality
of the statute in its most extreme interpretation. A guardian ad litem
was appointed to enable the chancellor to reach a decision, in spite of
97
the express statutory prohibition of this maneuver.
The question of jurisdiction was presented to the Court in two phases:
jurisdiction of the cause, and jurisdiction of the persons that might conceivably be involved in the suit. In holding that there was no jurisdiction of the cause, four cases were cited in substantiation. Tibbetts v.
Olson9 s and McDaniel v. McElvy 99 interpreted the 1925 act only. In
those cases the Court was careful to reserve the question as to whether
the Legislature could by a more carefully drafted enactment make a
bill against unknown defendants with unknown claims a justiciable
matter. The citation from McDaniel v. McElvy'OO shows this:
"... . but a bill seeking only to quiet a cloud, the nature and
existence of which is wholly unknown, as against defendants, who
are also wholly unknown, does not present a justiciable matter
under this statute in its present form."

182, 143 N. W. 324 (1913).
"'Key v. All Persons, 36 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1948).
IFRA. STAT. 1941, §66.42 (Supp. 1947). "If the bill be taken as confessed, a
guardian ad litem shall not be appointed unless it shall affirmatively appear that
the interests of minors, persons of unsound mind or convicts are involved."
"891 Fla. 824, 108 So. 679 (1926).
0C9 1

Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926).

20'Key v. All Persons, 36 So.2d 366, 369 (Fla. 1948). Italics supplied.
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Green v. Uniacke,' 0 citing McDaniel v. McElvy, simply paraphrased
the above statement. Brecht v. Bur-Ne Co. 0 2 was decided in 1926, but
the 1925 act was not yet in question. The statement quoted from that
case dealt with the 1889 act and is broad enough to foreclose many actions
now considered regular under the 1925 act. For example, a cloud on title
is required for equitable jurisdiction. At the time of the Brecht decision a
cloud was required to constitute such a claim as would create a prima
facie case in ejectment.' 0 3 The 1925 act' 0 4 specifically changed the
necessity for such a cloud as a basis of action to quiet title.
These four cases, then, cannot be considered as authority for a statement that such a bill fails to submit for determination a justiciable
matter; they did not deny, but rather affirmed, the power of the Legislature to create a new type of action such as this.
Similar statutes have been passed elsewhere, both for meeting emergencies' 0 5 and for routine application.' 0 6 Such power of the Legislature
was not considered, argued, or discussed in this case. Under the Florida
Constitution the circuit court may be given jurisdiction of causes not
strictly equitable.' 0 7 Such cause need not be either case or controversy
as contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.' 0 8 Since the Florida Legislature has power to create such
a cause and to confer jurisdiction on the circuit court, the action of the
lower court in taking jurisdiction and issuing process was proper.

146 F.2d 916 (C. C. A. 5th), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 847, 51 Sup. Ct. 493, 75

L. Ed. 1455 (1931).
1291 Fla. 345, 108 So. 173 (1926).
'Reyes
584 (1885).

v. Middleton, 36 Fla. 99, 17 So. 937 (1895); Benner v. Kendall, 21 Fla.

10

1FLA. STAT. 1941, §66.16.
... Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 88 Pac. 356
(1906); Bertrand v. Taylor, 87 Ill. 235 (1878).
'CAL. GEN. LAWS, Act 8589 (Deering, 1941) ; CoLo. STAT. ANN., c. 40, §169 (1935);
GA. ANN. CODE, tit. 2, c. 8 (Parks, 1922); ILL. REV. STAT., c. 30, §45 (1947); MASS.
GEN. LAWS, c. 185 (1932); MINN. GEN. STAT. §§6868-6950 (1913); NEB. CoMP. STAT.
§§5695-5799; N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §12 (1909); 1 N. C. CoMP. STAT., c. 47 (1919);
N. D. LAWS, c. 235 (1917); OHIO GEN. CODE §§8572-1 to 118; ORE. LAWS 438 (1901);
S. D. REv. CODE §§3060-3143 (1919); TENN. ANN. COnE §§3793a-3793a96 (1917);
UTAH ComP. LAWS §§4920-5008 (1917); VA. LAWS, c. 62 (1916); WASH. CoaiP. STAT.
(1922).
§§10622-10726
07
2 FLA. CoNST. Art. V, §11.
"'Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930).
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The second question of jurisdiction was whether the process in this
case was sufficient to obtain jurisdiction of all persons that might have
adverse claims. The particular argument advanced by the respondent
was that, although this statute was patterned closely on the McEnerney
act, the California interpretation of that act should not be applied, inasmuch as that act was passed as an emergency measure only.' 0 9 A
careful reading of the United States Supreme Court decision interpreting
that act, 1 o however, will show that the constitutional basis for permitting
such an action did not depend upon an emergency but rather upon the
inherent power of a state over the lands within its borders. The more
important interpretation placed upon that statute was that the plaintiff
must use due diligence to ascertain whether any adverse claim to the land
exists. 1 " The fact that the California Legislature did not see fit to
require an allegation by the plaintiff that he had used due diligence was
not conclusive, since the courts of California and other states have
repeatedly held that means of knowledge is knowledge itself, particularly
when dealing with public records. n 2 At the time the California act was
passed, shortly after the great San Francisco fire, there were no records;
but the application of this principle is just as valid in instances in which
there are public records in existence.
Due diligence by attorneys is expected in title suits as a matter of
course, and a specific requirement of this would be mere surplusage. With
this interpretation of the statute, the only serious objection raised by the
respondent is eliminated. It is not the province of the courts to question
the wisdom of the legislature, 3 or to hold a statute unconstitutional
when there is a valid interpretation that will sustain it. 1 4 In the
10
'CAL. STAT., c. 59 (June 16, 1906) is still in existence as CAL,. GEN. LAws,
Act 1026 (Deering, 1941).
1
"American Land Co. v. ZeLss, 219 U. S. 47, 31 Sup. Ct. 200, 55 L. Ed. 82 (1911).
"'McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926), citing Title & Document
Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 88 Pac. 356 (1906); Hoffman v. Superior
Court, 151 Cal. 386, 90 Pac. 939 (1907).
1
Wheaton v. Nolan, 3 Cal. App.2d 401, 39 P.2d 457 (1934); accord, Malone
Motor Co. v. Green, 213 Ala. 635, 105 So. 897 (1925); State v. Bagby's Est., 126
S. W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Irwin v. Holbrook, 32 Wash. 349, 73 Pac. 360
(1903); Bennett v. Greer Gas Coal Co., 127 W. Va. 184, 32 S. E.2d 51 (1944).
See also numerous cases cited 46 C. J. 545.
'"Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010, 84 L. Ed.
1375 (1939).
11
'United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 29 Sup. Ct. 527, 53
L. Ed. 836 (1909); accord, Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comn'n, 211 U. S.
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instant case such an interpretation existed but was overlooked.
The effect of this decision should be limited by the facts before the
Florida Supreme Court. It denied jurisdiction of the cause on the basis
of the facts alleged;115 and for this reason any discussion of the constitutionality of the statute itself was superfluous." 6
The ultimate result as to the cause of action in this case was correct
on other grounds. The plaintiff alleged title by adverse possession and
lack of knowledge of any adverse claim. He did not allege record title
in himself. Such allegations were obviously repugnant. The records of
title were in existence, and any normal exercise of reasonable diligence
would have dispelled the alleged ignorance of the plaintiff. Instead of
quashing service of process both courts should have dismissed the bill.
The 1947 statute provides that decrees will be entered in accordance with
the bill of complaint under the rules of chancery procedure; 1" 7 accordingly this bill, although valid to support jurisdiction over this general
type of case, did not confer jurisdiction to render a decree for the plaintiff
on the pleadings presented."18
VI.

CONCLUSION

The effect of this decision will depend upon the willingness of the
Florida Supreme Court in any future action, brought under this statute
in cases properly raising the real issues, to consider carefully the power
of the Legislature to create such a procedure in the light of similar
enactments such as the Torrens Act now in force in numerous states.
The Court can logically give effect to the intention of the Florida Legislature in this statute by construing it as embracing the general law
407, 29 Sup. Ct. 115, 53 L. Ed. 253 (1908); Knights Templar v. Jarman, 187 U. S.
197, 23 Sup. Ct. 108, 47 L. Ed. 139 (1902).
'Key v. All Persons, 36 So.2d 366, 368 (Fla. 1948): "The proceeding is
adversary in nature, yet the bill fails to present such adversary matter as would
justify the invoking of the court's jurisdiction."
' A refusal to take jurisdiction does not fall within the principle of stare
decisis in the federal courts, and a later case raising the same issue on the merits
can properly be considered. Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 13 L. Ed.
1058 (1851).
See Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting in Washington v. Dawson, 264
U. S. 219, 44 Sup. Ct. 302, 68 L. Ed. 646 (1924).
"'FLA. STAT. 1941, §66.38 (Supp. 1947).
""McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 679 (1926); see Lovett v. Lovett,
93 Fla. 611, 112 So. 768 (1927) ; Torrey v. Bruner, 60 Fla. 365, 53 So. 337 (1910).
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